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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Evidence-Witness~s-Competency of Husband and Wife
in Criminal Conversation Action
In a recent North Carolina case' a wife brought an action against
a feme defendant to recover damages for criminal conversation by
defendant with plaintiff's husband. Over objection, testimony by plain-
tiff relative to statements made to her by her husband tending to show
his illicit relationship with defendant was admitted. Held: Under mod-
em Married Woman's Statutes2 a wife can bring the action of criminal
conversation. Under the North Carolina statute governing competency
of husband and wife in civil actions, the admission of the testimony
relating to the husband's statements was error.
The case is one of first impression in North Carolina on the direct
question of the right of a wife to sue for criminal conversation. The
North Carolina Supreme Court had previously recognized this right in
a well-reasoned dictum in the case of Hinnant v. Tidewater Power
Company.4 The court in allowing the action in the instant case followed
what is a definite majority holding on this question.5
This decision, being on a question of first impression, suggests an
examination of the evidence statute here involved with some degree of
care.6 Passed in 1866, the statute abolished the common-law rule that
for centuries had made husband and wife incompetent as witnesses for
and against each other.7 But the abolition was not complete, for two
areas of incompetency were retained, one of them being "... any action
or proceeding for or on account of criminal conversation." Within this
area of incompetency, however, there is embodied an exception, vL-.,
that in actions of criminal conversation brought by the husband
in which the character of the wife is assailed she shall be a competent
witness to testify in refutation of such charges." It is this portion of
the statute, appearing as an amendment in 1919, with which this note
is primarily concerned."
'Knighten v. McLain, 227 N. C. 682, 44 S. E. 2d 79 (1947).2 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§52-1, 52-6, 52-10.
3 N. C. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1945) §8-56.
'189 N. C. 120, 122, 126 S. E. 307, 309 (1925).
5 See cases collected in 27 Am. Julus., HUSBAND AND WIFE, §535 (1944).6 N. C. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1945) §8-56: "In any trial . .. the husband or wife
of any party thereto, or of any person in whose behalf any such suit . . . is
brought, . . . shall, except as herein stated, be competent and compellable to give
evidence, as any other witness on behalf of any party to such suit, action or pro-
ceeding. Nothing herein shall render any husband or wife competent or com-
pellable to give evidence for or against the other in any action for or in con-
sequence of adultery, or in any action or proceeding for divorce on account of
adultery; or in any action or proceeding for or on account of criminal conversa-
tion, except that in actions of criminal conversation brought by the husband in
which the character of the wife is assailed she shall be a competent witness to
testify in refutation of such charges: Provided however, that in all such actions
or proceedings, the husband or wife shall be competent to prove and may be
required to prove, the fact of marriage."
Grant v. Mitchell, 156 N. C. 15, 71 S. E. 1087 (1911).Public Laws 1919, c. 18.
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Application of the statute in this area of incompetency has led to
certain incongruities. The declaration of incompetency has been applied
to make inadmissible indirect, as well as direct, testimony of the wife,
including declarations and admissions relating to the offense itself. It
has not applied to testimony of the plaintiff husband relating to the mis-
conduct of his wife, since she is not a party and he is not deemed to be
testifying "for or against" her.'0 The provision making the wife com-
petent to testify in refutation of charges against her character has been
applied in only one North Carolina case." "The net result is that the
wife's testimony and declarations cannot be used to establish her im-
proper relations with the defendant, but that in all other respects the
husband and wife are as competent in an action of criminal conversation
as in any other case ' 1
2
The advent of the action by the wife in the principal case focuses
attention on a new incongruity in the statute itself. Is there not injustice
in failure to provide that the husband can testify in refutation of charges
brought by the wife against his character? Will the courts remedy this
injustice by interpretation? There appears in the statute governing
competency of husband and wife in criminal cases a similar discrepancy
in the rights of the husband and wife to testify'3 which the courts have
disposed of. In an exception to incompetency against one's spouse, the
statute provides only forthe right of the wife to testify for the state
in criminal prosecutions of the husband for assault and battery upon
her, but since this was only declaratory of the common-law (which
included a right in both the husband and the wife in such a case) 14 the
court was able to permit a husband to testify in behalf of the state in a
criminal prosecution of his wife for assault and battery upon him.15
But the reasoning by which this right was so extended without express
statutory expression 16 is not applicable in the provision as to criminal
'McCall v. Galloway, 162 N. C. 353, 78 N. E. 429 (1913) ; Gardner v. Klutts,
53 N. C. 375, 376 (1861) (considering common-law prohibition generally the court
said, "It follows that [spouses'] declarations cannot be evidence for or against
[the other], otherwise, more weight is given to what she says when not on oath
than to what she would say on oath; which is absurd.").
10 Powell v. Strickland, 163 N. C. 393, 397, 79 S. E. 872, 874 (1913) ... she
is not a party to the record and has no legal interest in the action or its event,
that is, no interest that can by the rules of law be affected thereby.").
"Chestnutt v. Sutton, 204 N. C. 476, 168 S. E. 680 (1933).
"
2 STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §58 (1946).
N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §8-57: ". . -. Nothing herein shall render any hus-
band or wife competent or compellable to give evidence against each other in any
criminal action or proceeding, . . . except that in all criminal prosecutions of a
husband for an assault and battery upon his wife, . . . it shall be lawful to examine
the wife in behalf of the state against her husband."14 State v. Hussey, 44 N. C. 123 (1852).
10 State v. French, 203 N. C. 632, 166 S. E. 747 (1932); State v. Alderman,
182 N. C. 917, 110 S. E. 59 (1921) ; State v. Davidson, 77 N. C. 522 (1877).1 STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §59 n. 62 (1946) ("The competency*
of husband or wife in this type of action was recognized at common law, and
therefore is properly recognized under the statute which was intended to enlarge
and not restrict the common-law.").
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conversation which we are now examining. The common-law rule of
incompetency extended to actions of criminal conversation too,'7 thus
making the provision under consideration in derogation of the common-
law. Statutes in derogation of the common-law will be construed strictly
and not be extended beyond the scope of the legislative expression.18
Since it is assumed that it will be left up to the legislature to remedy
this injustice, this should be accomplished with little difficulty unless
there is some compelling reason for the omission. The cases are devoid
of any language indicating any reason for it. Did the legislature con-
template the present action when it passed the amendment? Most of
the jurisdictions that had passed on the question of the wife's right in
this action had recognized it.10 The North Carolina court had indicated
its attitude toward a wife's right to bring an action for invasion of her
marital rights in the husband. The outmoded idea that the male is
the aggressor, thus negativing his right to refute charges against his
character arising from his own action, was surely not in the minds of
the legislators.
The clue probably appears in a case where a husband was suing for
crimnal conversation, in which the court deplored the fact that the
statute denied the right of the wife to take the stand when her character
was so seriously assailed.21 There the court refused to follow the hold-
ing in divorce cases,2 2 which permitted the wife to testify in refutation
of charges brought by her husband in an action for divorce on grounds
of adultery, despite the omission of such a right in the statute. It is
most probable that the court's statements in that case provided the
impetus for the amendment to the statute and that the legislature, follow-
ing the language used there, never contemplated an action by the wife.
Examination of the statutes of other states casts little light on this
problem as they are so variant in their terms and phraseology that inter-
pretations of them give no real basis of comparison. But it is inter-
esting to note that of the ten states in the United States that have crim-
inal conversation as an exception (some as exception to competency,
1 Grant v. Mitchell, 156 N. C. 15, 71 S. E. 1087 (1911).
Is CRAWFORD, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §248 (1940); see Price v. Edwards,
178 N. C. 493, 101 S. E. 33 (1919) ; Rice v. Keith, 63 N. C. 319 (1868).
29See Note, 4 A. L. R. 569 (1919).
"0 Brown v. Brown, 121 N. C. 8, 27 S. E. 998 (1897) (alienation of affections).
21 Grant v. Mitchell, 156 N. C. 15, 17, 71 S. E. 1087, 1089 (1911) ("The rule
denying the right to the wife to be heard when her character is so seriously assailed
seems cruel, but we cannot permit this consideration to induce us to refuse to
give effect to the legislative act. She was offered as a witness against her hus-
band in an action on account of criminal conversation and this the statute says
cannot be done.").
22 Broom v. Broom, 130 N. C. 562, 565, 41 S. E. 673, 674 (1902) ("Her evi-
dence was in defense of herself, and not 'for or against' the other party, and the
statute disqualifies neither.as a witness in his or her own behalf, except only when
it is for or against the other.").
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others as exception to incompetency strangely enough) in the statutes
governing competency of the husband and wife as witnesses in civil
cases,23 only three2 4 make any distinction between testimony of the wife
and husband. In these three jurisdictions, only two cases have been
found which consider the possible reason for the distinction between
wife and husband. In Pennsylvania the court said, "Doubtless the
legislature considered there were good reasons for permitting the wife
to defend her character and conduct, but no sufficient reason for chang-
ing the common-law rule as .to the husband. '25  One New York court
made an interesting observation on their provision making the wife
competent for the defendant but not for the plaintiff, in actions for
criminal conversation, "The purpose of exclusion of wife as witness for
plaintiff, in actions for criminal conversation is to prevent collusion be-
tween husband and wife. If this is the purpose why should not the
husband also be disqualified if such an action will lie in behalf of the
wife? Is not this section in fact a legislative declaration that such an
action will not lie in behalf of the wife ?"26 The New York Court of
Appeals repudiated this reasoning in a later decision 7 in which the wife
was allowed to sue for criminal conversation. It is also interesting to
note that of these ten states, three have abolished the action of criminal
23 Criminal conversation as exception to competency generally: IND. ANN.
STAT. (Burns, 1933) §1720 (husband competent, wife not competent in suit for
seduction of wife); N. J. STAT. ANN. (1939) §2:97-9 (husband and wife not
compellable in this action); N. Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT (1947) §439 (wife competent
for defendant but not for plaintiff in this action).
Criminal conversation as exception to incompetency for or against:' PA. STAT.
ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 28, §319 (wife can testify in refutation of charges
against her character).
Criminal conversation as exception to incompetency for or against without con-
sent of other: ARiz. CoDE (1939) c. 23, §103; CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. (Deering,
1946) §1881; N. D. REv. CODE (1943) §31-0102; S. D. CoDE (1939) §36-0101.
Criminal conversation as exception to incompetency against the other: NEB.
Rv. STAT. (1943) §25-1203 (either may be witness against the other in this
action) ; Wyo. ComP. STAT. (Bobbs-Merrill, 1945) §3-2605 (wife competent against
husband in this action).
" New York: In any action for criminal conversation plaintiff's wife is not a
competent witness for plaintiff, but she is competent for defendant as to any matter
in controversy.
Pennsylvania: In all civil actions brought by husband, the wife shall be a com-
petent witness in rebuttal when her character or conduct is attacked upon the trial
thereof.
Wyoming: Husband and wife can be a witness for each other in all cases,
but not against. The wife can be a witness against the husband in an action for
criminal conversation.2 5 Ehrhart v. Bear, 51 Pa. Super. 39, 45 (1912).
"Strock v. Russell, - Misc. - , 132 N. Y. Supp. 968, 970 (1911); Oppen-
heim v. Kridel, - Misc. - , 198 N. Y. Supp. 157 (1923).
' Oppenheim v. Kridel, 236 N. Y. 156, 160, 140 N. E. 227, 231 (1923) ("Sec-
tion 349 of the Civil Practice Act [giving only the wife the right to testify for
defendant in a criminal conversation action] does not express any legislative in-
tent regarding this question [right of wife to bring criminal conversation action].
That provision simply declares a rule of evidence.").
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conversation by statute.28 As in North Carolina, the statutes of the
three states which contain a discrepancy similar to the one under con-
sideration were passed prior to recognition of a wife's right to bring
the action.2
Since the problem is one for the legislature, it is submitted that the
incompetency of husband and wife in criminal conversation cases ought
to be completely abolished. Fifteen states have expressly abolished by
statute the incompetency rule in its entirety30 The jurisdictions that
allow husband and Wife to testify for the other in all actions (whether
or not they have extended the right to testify against) have found no
upsetting situation in allowing the testimony in criminal conversation
cases.-3 The stage is set in North Carolina for another step toward a
complete abolition of incompetency. Maintaining this exception to
complete competency has created a greater anomaly in the law than the
old incompetency rule. Where the husband has joined with an action
for criminal conversation one for alienation of affections (as is usually
the case), burdensome problems present themselves as to admission of
evidence. The court has been compelled to instruct the jury that testi-
mony of the wife tending to show her relationship with defendant is
allowed, but can only be considered with reference to the latter charge.32
Plaintiff is permitted to present indirect testimony (declarations) of the
spouse tending to show the state of mind and feeling between himself
and his wife and the effect of the conduct of the defendant on them.38
Thus the jury, hfter listening to all this testimony, is burdened with the
task of making complicated distinctions that human nature practically
precludes.
'IN. J. STAT. ANN. (1939) §2:39A-1; N. Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT (1947) §§61 (a)
and (i); Wyo. Comp. STAT. (Bobbs-Merrill, 1945) §§3-512 and 3-513.
"9 New York:- L. 1877, c. 416, §184 (first recognized wife's right in crimlnal
conversation action in Oppenheim v. Kridel, supra, 1923).
Pennsylvania: 1907, May 8, P. L. 184, §1 (no case on wife's right in criminal
conversation action).
Wyoming: Laws 1899, c. 81, §1 (no case on wife's right in criminal conversation
action).
1Dat.. mRv. CODE (1935) §4691; FLA. STAT. ANN. (1943) §90.04; ILL. ANN.
STAT. (Smith Hurd, 1941) c. 51, §5; ME. REv. STAT. (1944) C. 100, §115; MD.
ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS (Flack, 1939) art. 35, §1; Mo. Rav. STAT. ANN. (1942)
§1892; N. H. REv. LAWS (1942) c. 392, §29; Onio GEN. CODE ANN. (Page,
1939) §11493; S. C. CODE (1942) §3692; TENN. ANN. CODE (Williams, 1934)
§9777; TEx. ANN. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 3715; VT. PuBaic LAWS
(1933) §1697; VA. CODE (Michie et al., 1942) §6210; W. VA. CODE (Michie et al.,
1943) §5727; Wis. STAT. (Brossard, 1943) §325.18.
"1 Smith v. Meyers, 54 Neb. 1, 74 N. W. 277 (1898); Phelps v. Utley, 92 Vt.
40. 101 At. 1011 (1917).2 Hyatt v. McCoy, 194 N. C. 760, 140 S. E. 807 (1927).
"Cottle v. Johnson, 179 N. C. 426, 102 S. E. 769 (1920) (an action for crim-
inal conversation and alienation of affections-plaintiff's wife's declarations as to
why she was not going back to plaintiff was held to be part of the res gestae.
The court said at p. 432, "We recognize the danger of evidence of this kind and
the opportunity it affords for collusion and for this reason it should be kept
within bounds With instructions [to the jury] as to how it should be consid-
ered....").
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Unless there is some compelling need for this area of incompetency
supported by stronger reasons than those given for the common-law
rule,34 it should be eliminated from the statute books. A reason pre-
sented by the court is to avoid "fraud and collusion."35 This was one
of the reasons noted for the common-law rule which has been discarded
for all other cases except this and divorce proceedings, and there is no
more danger of collusion here than in other cases. Actually there is
less danger considering the delicacy of the testimony, which no one
is prone to divulge even if true, ". . . and the interest of the state in
the marriage relation, which may justify extreme measures to prevent
collusion in divorce litigation is no excuse for a rule of incompetency
in criminal conversation actions."3 6 In fact one jurisdiction, in a case
of criminal conversation presented at a time when the wife was gen-
erally incompetent as a witness for or against her husband, has held
that a wife should be allowed to testify for the husband in this action
on grounds of public policy.37 At a time when speedy and accurate
administration of justice has become the watchword, this change is in
order.
R. W. BRADLEY, JR.
Federal Jurisdiction-State Statutes Enlarging Federal Equity
Jurisdiction-The Doctrine of Equitable Remedial Rights
Solely on a basis of diversity of citizenship a simple contract creditor
entered a federal court in Wisconsin and asked for a receiver. By prin-
ciples of old English Chancery as applied by the federal courts the plain-
tiff would not have been entitled to such relief until it had exhausted
its remedies at law. On the other hand, under the Wisconsin "Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act" the plaintiff was entitled to the relief.1
Held: Defendant's motion to dismiss denied.2
Under a similar set of facts in Pusey & Jones v. Hanssen the
United States Supreme Court reversed an order appointing a receiver
Powell v. Strickland, 163 N. C. 393, 400, 79 S. E. 872, 875 (1913)
... whether it was upon the ground of interest alone, when the testimony is in
favor of the spouse, or marital bias, or public policy when it is against, or whether
it was because they were considered as two souls in a single body....").
"See note 31 supra.
" STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §58 n. 42 (1946).
" Coy v. Humphries, 142 Mo. App. 92, - , 125 S. W. 877, 879 (1910) ("All
power should be given to society to punish those moral ulcers on the body politic
which corrupt its vitals and demoralize its members; and unless society shall
apply sufficient remedies to repress the erotic mania displayed in this case [defend-
ant enticed a wife into adultery] its most cherished and priceless institutions-
home and the family-will be destroyed. The admission of testimony of the wife
for the plaintiff was not error.").
'WIs. STAT. (Brossard, 1943) §242.10.
'Houseware Sales Corp. v. Quaker Stretcher Co., 70 F. Supp. 747 (E. D.
Wis. 1947).
'261 U. S. 491 (1923). See Comment, 33 YALE L. J. 193 (1923).
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